Results from the May 2019 WCI auction are now available. Both current and advance auctions sold out in full, at prices slightly higher than in recent auctions. The current auction settled at its highest price ever, $17.45, noticeably higher than the...
Near Zero comments on the California Energy Commission’s proposal for greenhouse gas accounting by retail electricity suppliers in the Power Source Disclosure Program.
Near Zero comments on the serious risk that excess allowances in the cap-and-trade program will frustrate its ability to deliver the emission reductions called for in the 2017 Scoping Plan, a potential loophole in the proposed definition of “direct environmental benefits” for carbon offsets, and the need to work toward a science-based policy strategy.
Near Zero's open-source model of the Western Climate Initiative cap-and-trade program is intended to help project, analyze, and track market outcomes. It allows users to explore the future market supply and demand balance through 2030, based on users' assumptions...
We present a method for tracking the private bank of compliance instruments, showing the extent to which allowance overallocation is manifesting
Danny Cullenward, Michael Mastrandrea, and Mason Inman of Near Zero, together with Geeta Persad of Union of Concerned Scientists, commented on the Aliso Canyon Mitigation Agreement regarding the 2015-2016 Aliso Canyon natural gas leak.
Ontario’s exit exacerbates allowance overallocation in the Western Climate Initiative cap-and-trade program
New data show that the net result of Ontario’s brief participation in California and Québec’s cap-and-trade program was to inflate the program’s supply by 13.2 million allowances, adding to concerns about allowance overallocation.
Danny Cullenward and Shelley Welton published a paper forthcoming in the Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin (Sept. 2018) discussing recent actions by FERC and implications for state energy and climate policies. A digital preprint is now available.
Managing the excess supply of allowances in California’s cap-and-trade program is arguably the most important question affecting the design of ARB’s post-2020 market
California’s “self-correcting” cap-and-trade auction mechanism does not eliminate market overallocation
ARB staff have suggested that California’s “self-correcting” cap-and-trade auction mechanism will address overallocation. Our calculations show this “self-correction” mechanism will eliminate only a fraction of the overallocation expected by 2020.
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